They Think This Turkey Can Fly

However, instead of trying to reclaim its oversight powers after the deaths of 346 people over the past year, the FAA has been pressing ahead with plans to further reduce its hands-on oversight of aviation safety, current and former officials said. The FAA has been pushing for changes intended to speed approval on critical safety questions and remake regulations using “voluntary consensus standards,” interviews and documents show. That could result in outsourcing policymaking on airplane safety to industry groups outside the public’s view, experts said.

FAA leaders say their approach is based on the premise that companies such as Boeing, and not regulators wielding the stick of enforcement, are best placed to guarantee safety. Rather than focusing on the nitty-gritty details of verifying Boeing’s claims that its airplanes are sound, FAA leaders say the agency should be doing more to make sure companies have their own formal systems in place for managing safety — and overseeing those systems to make sure they are working as promised.

The system, designed to automatically lower the plane's nose if it neared a stall, is suspected of forcing both Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 into the ground...On Lion Air Flight 610, the MCAS system kept reactivating as it relied on incorrect data from a single AOA sensor, eventually overpowering the flight crew and forcing the aircraft into the water, according to the NTSC's report. A preliminary report by Ethiopian government officials also found that the two AOA sensors had different readings and the plane's computer system pushed the nose down four times into a steep 40-degree dive as pilots struggled in vain to regain control.

The problems on board Lion Air Flight 610 began even before the aircraft left the runway, as the captain's stick shaker — an emergency system designed to warn the pilot of an imminent stall — suddenly activated. It remained active for most of the flight. Within 15 seconds, warnings appeared on the pilots' displays, alerting them that there were disagreements between key instrument readings. Two minutes into the flight, the MCAS system adjusted the aircraft's trim to push the nose down. It would keep doing this until the airliner eventually crashed.

If the MAX flies again soon, it will be a major test of the international credibility of U.S. aviation regulators, who risk finding themselves out of step with the rest of the world if authorities in Europe and elsewhere continue to prohibit the aircraft from flying in their airspace. Even so, Boeing said last week that it had completed a “dry-run” of a certification test flight for the MAX. The FAA has repeatedly said that the process for returning it to flight will take as long as required, but U.S. airlines that operate the plane are planning for a return to service early next year. FAA chief Steve Dickson — who days earlier had reprimanded Boeing for failing to show his agency the pilot messages — said last week that the company had hit several milestones, including handing over a key technical document.